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There has been a renewed interest in recent years in income inequality, but also economic 
mobility (both moving up and moving down), and income volatility, the year-to-year 
variations in income that families may or may not be able to smooth over. This is not just 
about the business cycle: the percentage of Americans worried about being laid off nearly 
quadrupled from 12 to 46 percent
2 in the years from 1982 to 1998, as the economy 
improved dramatically.  Over the same time frame, workers reported their subjective 
probability of job loss fell from close to 20 to less than 10 percent
3.  
To address these concerns, researchers, journalists, and politicians have joined the 
fray, seeking to measure and explain income inequality, mobility and volatility.  These 
related phenomena have different implications; as Senator Schumer said, “If you’re 
holding a job but your share of the pie is getting smaller, that’s a different set of policy 
needs than if you keep losing your job” (quoted by Leonhardt 2007). To date, however, 
there has been no unified approach to measuring these phenomena. 
I define an aggregate measure of income risk as half the squared coefficient of 
variation (or the general entropy measure with parameter 2, denoted GE2) of incomes 
measured over both people and time.  The aggregate measure can be decomposed into an 
inequality component measuring dispersion in mean incomes, a volatility component 
measuring the average dispersion of fluctuations about person-specific trends, and a 
mobility component measuring the dispersion of person-specific trends.  I then apply this 
decomposition to Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from the United States to 
characterize trends in inequality, volatility, and mobility over the last several decades.  I 
also examine the regressivity of income growth in these data. 
Background 
It is of little use to discuss inequality without some mention of changing incomes over 
time.  They may be changing due to short-lived transitory shocks, or more permanent 
changes, but either kind of change induces greater volatility in the income stream and 
greater relative
4 mobility.  Some view these changes as mitigating inequality (frequently 
citing Schumpeter 1955 or Friedman 1962), but if these changes reflect income risk, they 
                                                 
1 Original version June 3, 2008; this draft November 4, 2008.  The author acknowledges helpful comments 
from participants at the IRISS 10
th Anniversary Workshop in Differdange, Luxembourg, October 24-25, 
2008, including Stephen Jenkins, Markus Jäntti, Martin Biewen, and Philippe Van Kerm. 
2 Nichols and Zimmerman (2008), quoting poll results from the International Survey Research Corporation 
in Chicago; see also Greenspan (1997). 
3 Leonhardt (2007), quoting Gallup poll results. 
4 I am calling growth in incomes relative to average growth “relative mobility” so both volatility and 
mobility may result in reranking of individuals within the income distribution in any one period or over 
time. lower well-being, holding constant the mean level of income.  This paper inclines toward 
the latter viewpoint, characterizing observed changes in income as reflecting dispersion, 
and I define an aggregate measure of income risk that can be decomposed into a long-run 
inequality component, a volatility component, and a mobility component. 
Of course, greater absolute mobility, especially growth in real incomes, may change 
our interpretation of these other features.  A doubling of real incomes may make us less 
worried about increasing trends in volatility combined with constant relative mobility and 
increasing inequality, though the change in measured (scale-invariant) inequality due to a 
doubling of incomes is nil.  I will briefly discuss income growth toward the end, but for 
most of the text, I will restrict my attention to total mobility, or the sum of absolute and 
relative mobility.  I will focus exclusively on measuring inequality and volatility and 
mobility, not characterizing their welfare consequences.
5 
Inequality in observed incomes is not inequality in well-being, or important outcomes 
such as mortality rates.  Even if we regard income
6 as a valid measure of well-being, 
inequality of observed incomes is a poor measure of inequality of income distributions. 
Measured inequality is positive when all incomes are drawn from the same distribution.  
That is, if every individual in society has income in every period that is a random draw 
from the same distribution (implying equality of opportunity) the inequality of observed 
outcomes across individuals will be nonzero, and overstate inequality of opportunity. 
On the other hand, inequality estimates in survey data are typically biased downward. 
Breunig (2001) shows that the bias of the GE2 estimator
7 (estimating half the squared 
coefficient of variation, or the general entropy measure with parameter 2), used in the rest 
of this paper, has the sign of 3 times the coefficient of variation (CV) less twice the 
population skewness.  So for income distributions that exhibit large positive skew, the 
bias of the GE2 estimator is usually negative.  This property also holds if we imagine 
having population data on income and estimating an inequality parameter for the 
superpopulation, or family of populations from which the current population data are 
drawn.  So if the inequality of incomes in the hypothetical population or superpopulation 
is positive, we will typically underestimate that positive level of inequality. 
Thus there may be two offsetting biases: variation in observed outcomes may 
overstate variation in potential outcomes, but measured variation in observed outcomes 
may understate potential variation in observed outcomes.  In other words, population 
inequality (of outcomes) may overstate inequality of opportunity, but sample inequality 
may understate population inequality.  However, these biases are unavoidable, and there 
is good reason to think they are small given a large sample over many years. 
Volatility is also never, strictly speaking, observed.  As the volatility of a stock is 
estimated using historical data on changes in price, so income volatility is often measured 
                                                 
5 See for example Atkinson (1970) and Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) for connections to social welfare.  I 
will follow the lead of Sen (1973) in pursuing descriptive measures. 
6 Many authors have pointed out that well-being is multidimensional and cannot be characterized using a 
simple scalar variable like observed income; see for example Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Maasoumi 
(1986), and Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003). 
7 The GE2, or variance divided by twice the squared mean, has desirable properties described by e.g. 
Shorrocks (1984). On its bias and MSE, see also Breunig and Hutchinson. (2008). On alternatives to GE2, 
see e.g. Atkinson (1970), Blackorby et al (1981), Cowell (1995,2000). 
  2as variation in income over time.  However, this reflects behavioral changes, 
measurement error, and both short-term and long-term real changes in income. Some 
authors attempt to decompose variability of income over time into permanent and 
transitory shocks, but this requires specifying a model of income dynamics that applies to 
all individuals (see e.g. Lillard and Weiss 1978, Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995, Baker 
1997), and it is very likely that no such model would survive empirical tests of its 
restrictions in a more flexible model that nests it (for example by treating additional 
implications of the model not strictly required to identify parameters as overidentifying 
restrictions in a Generalized Method of Moments framework).  In short, income exhibits 
individual heterogeneity in levels and growth rates which are not independent of the 
history of income levels and gains.  In contrast, the approach adopted in this paper 
imposes no distributional assumptions on income at a point in time or on income growth 
(though linear and loglinear trends are measured, these are conceived as short-run 
approximations to arbitrary individual-specific paths of income over time). 
Mobility has been defined in many different ways, and the term encompasses many 
different concepts.  Relative mobility and absolute mobility have already been discussed, 
and various authors define various versions of directional mobility or exchange 
mobility.
8  One measure of mobility (Shorrocks 1978a; Fields 2007) depends on the 
reduction in inequality due to averaging or summing individual incomes across time. Thi
definition implicitly assumes that the sum or average of income is the key factor in 
determining well-being, and that the effects of variation in income around the mean have
negligible welfare consequences.  Other definitions of mobility rely on transition matrices
between states (Shorrocks 1978b; Geweke et al. 1986; Alcalde-Unzu et al. 2006), b
these founder on several well-known difficulties associated with transition matrices. 
Using transition matrices, definitions of categories characterizing states will affect 
results, e.g. quintiles or deciles, and the current state is typically not a sufficient statistic 
for transition probabilities as is required for a Markov process (meaning that the 





terize the process).  
                                                
Methods 
Inequality and volatility are always characterized as some measure of dispersion, or 
variability, of a distribution. The overarching idea of the method is that we want to 
measure variability in income using panel data, observations both across individuals and 
across time. Imagine measuring income of three individuals a, b, and c for three years 1, 
2, and 3: we can arrange observations first by time: 
| a1 b1 c1 | a2 b2 c2 | a3 b3 c3 | 
or first by individual: 
| a1 a2 a3 | b1 b2 b3 | c1 c2 c3 | 
which suggests two decompositions by group, where group is defined by a time index t or 
alternatively by an individual index i. The natural choice (Shorrocks 1984) of inequality 
 
8 Fields and Ok (1999) offer a review of this broad field of research. Benabou and Ok (2001) define 
desirable mobility as progressive income growth and Mazumder (2008) attempts to measure only upward 
mobility. 
  3measure for decompositions by group is the generalized entropy measure GE2, equal to 
half the squared coefficient of variation. 
Suppose we observe L people
9, indexed by i running from 1 to L, observed at T 
points in time, for N=LT observations on income y. Consider first a decomposition by 
population subgroup following Shorrocks (1984) where the population is all person-years 
and subgroups are people: 
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where  i y  indicates the within-person sample mean of income over all time periods 
observed, and  y  is the sample mean of income over all persons and time periods. The 
first term Bi represents variation across individuals in their mean income over some time 
period of T years, i.e. T-year inequality.  The second term Wi represents variation of 
individual income around mean income, i.e. volatility.
10   
We can think of the term Bi as measuring the variance of fixed effects from a 
regression (of income on no explanatory variables).  The variance estimate in the term Bi 
overstates the true variance of fixed effects (Aaronson et al. 2007), because of the 
sampling variation in the sample mean.  I.e. let μi be the deviation of each person’s mean 
income from the population mean income; then because 
[] () [ ]
2 2 2 ˆ E ˆ E i i i i μ μ μ μ − + =  
the variation in individual-specific sample means (over some time frame) overstates the 
variation in individual-specific true means by the amount of sampling variation in the 
sample mean, and we would like to estimate the sampling variation and subtract it from 
our variance estimate.  
The sampling frame one imagines here is not the usual one assumed that guarantees 
the favorable properties of a simple random sample, where we have independent 
observations on individual income at a point in time.  For measuring inequality in mean 
incomes over some time period we would like incomes to be measured without error; if 
                                                 
9 Another choice of analysis unit is of course possible, for example family or household, but these are much 
less convenient when dealing with panel data, since composition may change over time. 
10 Alternatively, consider a decomposition of the form 
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where the first term Wt represents variation around a “year effect” and measures variation across people 
from year-specific means, or a weighted average of year-specific inequality measures.  The second term Bt 
measures variations in individual year means around the longer-run mean, or “aggregate volatility” in 
individual incomes.  The first term in each of these expressions represents variation across individuals at a 
point in time, or inequality.  The second term represents variation across time periods, or volatility.  Only 
the first decomposition relates to our conception of volatility of individual incomes, however. Therefore we 
will focus only on the decomposition of G into Wi and Bi.  
 
  4we had repeated independent measurements of income at each point in time, we could 
calculate an estimate of the sampling variation at each point in time, and thereby adjust 
our estimate of the variance mean downward by the mean squared standard error.  
In practice however we have variation across time that reflects both sampling 
variation in the long-run mean of income and changes in true income over that period of 
time.  The sampling variation in the individual-specific sample means, computed using 
variation in incomes across time, therefore incorporates two sources of variation, one due 
to sampling variation in the mean and one due to changing incomes (mobility and 
volatility).  We can regard using as our estimate of sampling variation the square of the 
standard error of the mean computed in the usual way, dividing the sample standard 
deviation by the number of time periods, as a likely upper-bound estimate.  Thus 
unadjusted estimates of variance in mean incomes and those adjusted downward to 
account for the effect of sampling variation on our estimate of variation plausibly bound 
variation in true means (both version are presented in Results below). 
The sampling variation in the individual-specific sample means is estimated by the 
individual-specific sample standard deviation over the number of time periods, or the 
summand of Wi divided by (T-1). So the variance estimate in the term Bi should be 
reduced by that amount; in order to keep the total unchanged, we must add the same 













































































































































Combining terms in the second component, we can see that the summand in the second 
component is now scaled by T over (T-1), which is the usual adjustment for variance 

























Thus both estimates are corrected for sampling variation, and the sum remains 
unchanged. We call the corrected components I for inequality in mean income and D for 
deviations around the mean.  To be precise, these components are inequality in 
individual-specific mean incomes over time (for I) and variance of deviations over time 
around the individual-specific means (for D). 
We can further decompose the second term D (“deviations”) into a component due to 
individual trends in income, and a component due to variations around trend. This is most 
intuitively understood by imagining regressing individual income on a time trend and a 
constant, and letting the sum of squared residuals be defined as the component due to 
variations around trend.  The difference between the second term D and the mean over 
individuals of the individual-specific sum of squared residuals (or variation in detrended 
and demeaned income) is the individual-specific variance of predicted income over T 
  5years, which is proportional
11 to the mean across individuals of the squared individual-













































































( ) M V I M M D I GE + + = + − + = 2 . 
I will call the terms V for “volatility” and M for “mobility risk” though of course 
other measures of those concepts are also possible. V now captures squared deviations 
around the linear individual-specific trend in income. M measures the extent to which 
incomes grow or fall over time; it represents the expected squared trend in incomes.  We 
can also additively decompose this into components proportional to the variance of trends 
and the expected trend squared. Write 
A R V I M V I GE + + + = + + = 2 . 
where R is relative mobility risk and A is absolute mobility risk (proportional to the 
squared mean of estimated trends across all individuals, a constant). R measures how 
much incomes differentially grow or fall over time, or the dispersion of individual-
specific trends in income; if T=5, this measure is simply twice the variance of trends.  If 
everyone experienced the same average income growth over time (i.e. ri=E(ri) for all i) 
then R=0. Thus, R actually measures “relative mobility risk” or the variance of individual 
growth rates in income, not the mean growth rates (level of absolute mobility), nor the 
covariance of growth rates with mean levels of income (pro-rich growth).   
However, the term A is negligible in applications presented here, since it is the 
squared mean across individuals of individual-specific growth rates in income divided by 
mean income squared and is therefore is very small relative to R (i.e. A is on the order of 
two to five percent of M in every instance examined, and would not be visible on a graph 
of trends over time).   
Note that assuming linear growth in individual incomes and estimating the rates even 
over some short time period is not uncontroversial.  Often researchers assume a constant 
percentage rate of growth in incomes over time, or regress log income on time.  This 
assumption does not match the empirical distribution of income growth, and drops any 
observations with zero or negative income in a period (limiting the sample to those with 
lower variation over time since anyone with income that drops to or rises from that low 
level of income), but I duplicate all the estimates using log income for comparison 
purposes (results in the appendix). 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the variance of predicted values is the squared growth rate times the variance of the time 
index, where the time index t is always defined so that it has mean zero, so that the constant term measures 
mean income. The variance of predicted values rit for an individual i is thus the square of the growth 
estimate ri times the variance of t or ri
2(T
2-1)/12. 
  6We can embed the above calculations in a regression framework using panel data by 
writing a fixed-effects model with individual-specific linear time trends: 
it i i it e t r u y + + =  
where ui is an individual fixed effect, ri is an individual growth rate, and eit is the 
idiosyncratic error. We then estimate I by the variance of estimated fixed effects (with or 
without the adjustment for estimation error), V as the mean squared residual from the 
regression (plus the adjustment), and R as the variance of predicted values, measuring in 
essence the variance of coefficients on t. These would all be divided by twice mean 
income in the sample to get GE2 measures.  
This regression framework suggests a further degrees-of-freedom adjustment 
implemented by scaling each quantity by N/(N-2L)=T/(T-2) to account for the estimation 
of intercepts and trends (2L parameters), but since this applies to each quantity, and does 
not affect their relative size in any way, I drop this adjustment.  We might also adjust our 
estimate of the variance of individual growth rates ri using standard errors of those 
estimates, but it is not immediately clear what standard errors we should use, nor that the 
subtracting off the mean of squared estimated standard errors would be an improvement.  
In particular, if we tried to cluster on the panel identifier (essentially the approach taken 
in estimating standard errors for individual-specific means ui) and estimate standard 
errors for individual growth rates ri we would get zero for each estimate. 







































































































1 ˆ ,  
which together sum to the variance of income across all observations divided by twice 
mean income, which is defined as estimated total income risk: 
M V I E G ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 + + = , 
so the sum is just the estimated GE2 for all income observations, computed over both 
individuals and time. 
Note that this measure does not characterize the progressivity of income growth or 
the change in income inequality over the period of T years.  Studying successive T-year 
periods, we can decompose changes in inequality, volatility, and mobility across periods.  
However, a straightforward set of measures of change within the T-year period involve 
the correlation of estimates of  the mean level of income ui with volatility var(eit
2) and 
mobility ri. To the extent that the individual mean level of income ui is correlated with the 
individual volatility var(eit
2) we can say that idiosyncratic risk is progressively 
distributed, suggesting that individuals may be making a risk-return tradeoff (or, possibly, 
  7much volatility may be regarded as positive shocks relative to baseline income). To the 
extent the mean level of income ui is correlated with mobility ri income growth can be 
said to be pro-rich, and in that case income inequality is rising during the T-year period.  
Heteroskedastic errors eit in the regression framework  it i i it e t r u y + + =  with variance 
increasing in t reflect increasing volatility patterns in the T-year period under study. 
To measure T-year inequality, volatility, and mobility, we need only T years of data 
on each individual in a survey (and to use weighted means instead of unweighted means 
in the previous formulas). For example, we can use five years from a longer panel and 
measure 5-year inequality as the inequality across individuals in 5-year averages of 
income.  But this would say nothing about the trend in inequality. 
If we want to measure trends in inequality, volatility, and mobility, we must of course 
have a much longer panel. Given a panel of some fixed length, for example 2T years of 
panel data, we can imagine computing a single 2T-year measure of inequality and other 
components using a very small balanced panel (for only those individuals observed in 
every survey year), or using the first T years to construct one estimate and the second 
nonoverlapping period of T years (beginning in year T+1 and running to year 2T) to 
construct another estimate.  Changes in T-year inequality, volatility, and mobility are 
then immediately apparent.  More generally, with 2T years of data, we can construct T+1 
estimates, for each period of T contiguous years. 
Data 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from the United States for survey 
years 1970 to 2005 (income years 1969 to 2004) to characterize trends in inequality, 
volatility, and mobility. Taxes are imputed using TAXSIM
12.  
Because the PSID moved to a biennial survey in 1997, it makes sense to exclude 
every other year in earlier years as well, so that the concepts are the same in every year.  
A T-year estimate then covers 2T-1 calendar years, due to skipping every other calendar 
year in retrieving T years of data. Thus, with data from 1970 to 2004, we can for example 
construct 5-year estimates from 1978 (using 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978 data and 
assigning estimates to the last year of data used) to 2004 (using 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 
and 2004 data), with gaps in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. We could likewise construct 6-
year estimates from 1980 (using  1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980 data) to 2004 
(using 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 data).  A 10-year estimate would include 
data from 1986 and 1988 in both the first (1988) and last (2004) year of estimates, each 
of which would use data spanning 19 calendar years. 
A longer period T is desirable for better estimates of the volatility component, but 
clearly if we wish to measure trends, a shorter period is preferable (so that we may 
compute more estimates across periods of length T).  Note that T must be at least 3 for 
each individual for that individual’s observations to be used, but that the variance of the 
idiosyncratic error term used to characterize volatility will tend to be dramatically 
understated for small T, and I will use T = 5 in this paper. I also compare results for 
T=5,6,7,8, and 9 (results in the appendix) as a rough measure of sensitivity to this choice, 
                                                 
12 Version 8 at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/taxsim-calc8/ (see also Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). 
  8indicating that longer periods increase volatility estimates and lower inequality estimates, 
as one might expect. 
Another concern is that the variance of the idiosyncratic error term used to 
characterize volatility also captures measurement error, but this is in a deep sense 
inevitable—one cannot observe short-run variation in income and know whether it 
represents true short-run variation in income or misreported or mismeasured income.  
This applies even to administrative earnings records, or to datasets with merged 
administrative records and survey responses.  The only approaches to separately estimate 
volatility and measurement error components require structural models of income 
distributions that can usually be rejected (in the statistical sense) by the very data used to 
fit them. To the extent that measurement error is increasing over time, any upward trend 
in volatility may represent increases in the volatility of true income, or increases in the 
volatility of measured income with no change in the volatility of true income. 
I present results for family income for all individuals aged 30 to 60, including the 
cash value of transfers and cash-equivalent in-kind benefits (food stamps), including or 
excluding tax liabilities, with and without adjustment for family size. My adjustment for 
family size is accomplished by dividing family income by the square root of number of 
people in the family—see for example Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) and Cowell 
and Jenkins (1995) on equivalence scales—but various alternative adjustments alter my 
results very little, possibly because I always restrict my sample to the nonelderly adult 
population and use individual person weights.  
The degree of attrition over time in the PSID is substantial, hovering around 5 to 7 
percent in most years.  Over five years of data, spread over 11 calendar years, this can 
produce attrition rates of 30 percent or more when looking at a subset of data forming a 
balanced panel.  To account for this type of attrition in short panels of length T years 
across 2T-1 calendar years, I use the first year panel weights (adjusting for attrition from 
the survey up to that point) and calculate an adjustment factor to differentially adjust 
weights by 1/(1-p) where p is the estimated probability of attrition from a logit of attrition 
on characteristics (race, sex, and single year of age). 
Topcoded income in the PSID represents a major threat to these decompositions, 
since the GE2 index emphasizes variation in larger incomes (whereas a 90/10 ratio would 
be largely immune to this threat).  For this reason, I drop the top two percent of income 
values in all years. I also compare these results (in the appendix) to fifty imputations of 
the top two percent of income values (imputing from a Pareto distribution with 
parameters estimated using income from the 90th percentile to the 98th), which should in 
some sense bound the size of the problem, and it does not appear to be a large issue.   
Results 
Looking first at five-year inequality, the impact of including taxes is apparent in both 
family-size-adjusted and unadjusted results (figures 1 and 2 respectively). After-tax 
incomes are substantially less unequal, with inequality index values about one third to 
two thirds as large as those for pretax incomes.  This is to be expected, given the 
progressivity of the US income tax system. The pattern over time of the ratio of pretax 
inequality to after-tax multiperiod inequality exhibits remarkable stability, ranging from 
  960 to 70 percent with a peak in 1991, and is remarkably similar using different 
accounting periods. 
The effect of accounting for sampling variation in sample means of individual family 
incomes over five years of data is relatively small, lowering the estimate of inequality by 
about 7 percent (and simultaneously increasing volatility and mobility estimates by 25 
percent).  The effect on levels is visible in each graph, and the effect on measured trends 
is negligible. 
The impacts of accounting period T (shown in the appendix) are modest relative to 
the differences across pretax and after-tax estimates of inequality fixing the accounting 
period, though there is a clear ordering, where longer accounting periods produce lower 
estimates of long-run inequality.  This is to be expected, as Shorrocks (1978) and other 
writers have noted, since there is some regression to the mean over time. The impact of 
family size adjustments on estimates of long-run inequality is quite modest compared to 
the effects of accounting for taxes or changing the period length.  In fact, there is no 
difference visible in graphs until after 1996, and the indices differ only in the second 
significant digit in all years. 
The impact of netting out estimated taxes from family income on estimated volatility, 
shown in figure 3, is similar to the impact on inequality.  Volatility estimates are roughly 
50 to 80 percent as large for after-tax income as for pretax income.  Additionally, some of 
the year-to-year instability of estimates is substantially reduced after deducting tax 
liabilities from family income.  The variance-stabilizing effects of income taxes are 
presumably due to the progressive rate structure in the US. 
The impact of accounting period on estimated volatility is small, as shown in the 
appendix, but longer accounting periods lead to higher estimates of volatility.  One 
reason for this is possibly downward bias in the estimator, so that longer accounting 
periods are more plausibly estimating dispersion in income around long-run trends, 
though the results of Breunig (2001) do not apply to this particular case. As the 
accounting period is extended from 5 to 9 years of data (9 to 17 calendar years), the 
impact of any further extensions of the accounting period grow smaller, which is 
consistent with the notion that as T gets larger, the estimator is converging on some true 
value (though that notion would be misguided here, since the data used varies across 
estimates; the notion of asymptotic convergence would not apply in any application to 
real data).  In any case, it is reassuring that the accounting period has only a small impact 
on volatility estimates. 
The impact of family size adjustments on estimated volatility is reasonably small 
(comparing figure 4 to figure 3), raising the estimates by a factor of one third or so.  This 
is largely due to the fact that family size tends not to adjust up and down over short time 
periods, but rather to evolve over a longer time period. That is, shocks due to divorce or 
marriage or the birth or departure of children tend to be persistent shocks.  For that 
reason, much of the impact of family size adjustments is seen in the mobility risk 
estimates (comparing figure 6 to figure 5). 
The impact of netting out taxes on mobility risk estimates (figure 5) is comparable to 
inequality and volatility, on the order of a one third reduction in estimated risk, also due 
to the progressivity of taxes. The family size adjustment produces more substantial 
  10differences for mobility, perhaps due to mobility in family size (changing household 
composition over the panel). 
The impacts of accounting periods are much larger than for inequality or volatility 
estimates, as shown in the appendix.  That accounting periods make more difference for 
mobility risk is not surprising, since much longer accounting periods offer more 
opportunity for low-probability sharp drops and rises to be observed, but more time over 
which temporary shocks may be smoothed out by longer-term trends.  If those who have 
declining income between two periods tend to have rising income the next, for regression 
to the mean in income growth rates, a longer accounting period would tend to lower 
estimated mobility risk, which is consistent with the observed effect in appendix figures 5 
and 6.  Another plausible story is that longer accounting periods tend to produce more 
precisely estimated coefficients for individuals, reducing the component of the variation 
due to estimation error (that component is not captured in the appendix figures). 
Overall, these estimates suggest that long-run inequality increased about 50 percent, 
or increased by a factor of three halves, over the last 25 years.  Similarly, volatility risk 
appears to have increased about 40 to 60 percent and mobility risk about 30 to 50 percent 
over the same period.  Volatility and mobility risk estimates are less stable than long-run 
inequality estimates, in that they are more sensitive to specification choices, and long-run 
inequality is the dominant component of the aggregate income risk measure. The 
aggregate risk measure, summing inequality, volatility, and mobility risk, has also 
increased approximately 50 percent over the last 25 years. 
  11Figure 1.  Long-run inequality estimates (five years of data over 11 calendar years), for 
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  12Figure 2.  Long-run inequality estimates (5 years of data over 11 calendar years), for 
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  13Figure 3.  Year-to-year volatility estimates (5 years of data over 11 calendar years), for 
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  14Figure 4.  Year-to-year volatility estimates (5 years of data over 11 calendar years), for 
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  15Figure 5.  Multiyear mobility estimates (5 years of data over 11 calendar years), for 
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  16Figure 6. Multiyear mobility estimates (5 years of data over 11 calendar years), dividing 
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Regressivity of Growth 
The regressivity of income growth within each five-year period can be measured as the 
correlation or covariance of mean income ui (mean over five years) and individual-
specific growth rates ri, as explained above.  This is measured quite apart from the 
inequality, volatility, and mobility risk discussed in the previous section, though it is 
clearly related to trends in these measures; see Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) for 
additional relevant discussion of pro-poor growth. 
Figure 7 presents results for a period length T of 5 years (other periods produce 
broadly similar results, as shown in the appendix), for both correlations and covariances, 
  17imposing no adjustment for family size. In all years and all specifications, the regressivity 
measure is positive, indicating that richer individuals tend to enjoy greater income growth 
over the eleven-year periods studied. In the pretax income panels on the left, correlation 
is decreasing over time while covariance is increasing, which reflects the increasing 
variances that the covariance is divided by to obtain the correlation coefficient.  
Using after-tax income as in the panels on the right, however, produces very different 
estimates.  The trend in the regressivity of income growth when looking at pretax income 
is not clear, since one measure increases and the other falls. The regressivity of after-tax 
income, on the other hand, increased sharply through the 1980’s and fell in the 1990’s, 
measured either as a correlation or a covariance.  These periods correspond respectively 
to a period following pro-rich tax reform in 1981, and a period following pro-poor tax 
reforms in 1990 and 1993.  An identical pattern is observed using income deflated by the 
square root of family size (figure 8). 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  20Extensions 
Straightforward extensions include decomposing the inequality, volatility, and mobility 
measures by income type (Shorrocks 1982) or by population subgroup (Shorrocks 1984).  
More generally, once we have embedded the measurement of inequality, volatility, and 
mobility in a panel regression framework as above, it is natural to consider measuring 
these quantities conditional on covariates.  I.e. instead of writing 
it i i it e t r u y + + =  
we might write  
it it i i it e X t r u y + + + = β  
and measure proportional reductions in inequality, volatility, and mobility due to some 
set of variables X.  This exercise is analogous to that of Cowell and Jenkins (1995).   
However, the interpretation of changes over time and the variability of the residual is 
substantially complicated by the introduction of covariates. 
Alternatively, we might ask whether increases in inequality, volatility, and mobility 
are explained by changes in the distribution of X or changes in coefficients as in the 
Blinder-Oaxaca model (Jann 2008), or semi-parametrically estimate changes in 
inequality, volatility, and mobility not explained by changes in the distribution of X using 
the methods of Dinardo et al (1996) and others.
13  Note this exercise can be done for 
changes across years, or across subpopulations within a year. 
We might also replace our measure of income with another measure, for example 
after-tax income, and compare changes in inequality, volatility, and mobility and how 
they relate to changes in the tax code over time. Alternatives to this method include the 
decomposition into reranking (horizontal inequity) and ex post inequality (vertical 
inequity) proposed by King (1983) using an Atkinson index, or decomposition of a 
change (over time, but easily reconceived as two tax regimes instead of two calendar 
years) into progressivity of income changes and reranking proposed by Jenkins and Van 
Kerm (2006) using a generalized Gini index.  
The proposed extensions offer the possibility of decomposing the effects of changes 
in education and labor markets, family structure, taxes, and other important factors on the 
observed changes in inequality, volatility, and mobility. 
The regression framework could also be extended in another direction by moving to a 
multilevel mixed-effects regression framework, modeling ri as a random effect, or adding 
a subscript i to β in the above equation (and perhaps assuming individual-specific trends 
are normally distributed). This type of extension trades a set of very strong and 
unverifiable assumptions for potentially improved efficiency of estimation.  Nevertheless, 
moving in this direction offers the possibility of using large-sample theory to conduct 
tests on or construct confidence intervals for trends in inequality, volatility, and mobility, 
so the approach may appeal to the more parametrically minded. 
                                                 
13 See Dinardo (2002) and Lemieux (2002) for additional discussion of using reweighting to compare wage 
distributions.  
  21Conclusions 
The decomposition of variability in income across people and time undertaken here 
produces remarkably stable results across a variety of specifications.  Calling total 
variability in incomes, measured as half the squared coefficient of variation or GE2, a 
measure of income risk, it can be expressed as the sum of long-run inequality (a measure 
of income risk from behind the veil of ignorance
14), volatility or short-run fluctuations 
around a person-specific time trend, and variation in time trends or “mobility risk.”  The 
results are relatively insensitive to the time period over which time trends are calculated, 
as summarized in figure 9, which compares results using 5 years or 7 years of data for 
each individual, and shows each component “stacked” to indicate that they add up to total 
income risk. The results are also relatively insensitive to adjustments for family size, as 
shown in figure 10, comparing results using 5 years data with no adjustment to those  
dividing family income by the square root of family size.  All of these results indicate 
that long-run inequality is the dominant form of income risk in these data, but that all 
forms of income risk appear to be increasing over time. 
 
                                                 
14 On the veil of ignorance see Harsanyi (1953,1955) and Rawls (1971). 
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  26Appendices: Informal sensitivity analysis 
A. Sensitivity to accounting period 
The following figures reproduce figures from the text, using different period lengths T. 
Figure A1.  Long-run inequality estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 


























































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  27Figure A2.  Long-run inequality estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 






























































































































































  28Figure A3.  Year-to-year volatility estimates by accounting period, including estimated 


































































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  29Figure A4.  Year-to-year volatility estimates by accounting period, including estimated 






































































































































































  30Figure A5.  Multiyear mobility estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 
































































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  31Figure A6.  Multiyear mobility estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  33B. Sensitivity to using imputing income for top two percentiles 
Instead of dropping income values above the 98th percentile, which are very likely to be 
subject to differential topcoding across years, we might also impute those values from a 
Pareto distribution in each year, estimating the parameter alpha using incomes between 
the 90th and 98th percentile, and using the 90th percentile as the lower bound of the 
distribution.  Estimated parameters (fitted via maximum likelihood) are shown in table 
B1, and results from 50 independent imputations are shown in figure B1. 
Table B1.  Pareto distributions used to impute the top two percent of income. 
Survey Year  98th %ile  90th %ile  alpha 
1978 105.33509  76.301659  8.5679449 
1979 106.02862  76.354265  6.7376685 
1980 102.60172  73.389345  7.7732366 
1981 102.93658  71.956951  7.5134341 
1982 103.20701  71.115054  7.4878477 
1983 109.9004  74.885575  6.5834831 
1984 112.43667  77.286356  7.9586754 
1985 120.24363  79.339499  6.8777939 
1986 124.5292  82.444518  6.9192172 
1987 146.60245  86.879949  5.9081968 
1988 138.09871  87.835515  5.7427734 
1989 148.88968  88.158087  5.835943 
1990 156.95968  93.423111  6.3427248 
1991 145.22603  90.040234  5.4257135 
1992 147.6086  88.976781  5.2909079 
1993 148.68757  92.45255  5.4277781 
1994 177.72397  91.01348  4.7987236 
1995 163.88831  93.411556  5.8658378 
1996 156.41409  93.758509  5.5298427 
1997 171.62696  95.127887  4.8283084 
1999 175.61834  98.698668  4.8020838 
2001 222.07464  105.60792  4.0157911 
2003 165.96979  100.12624  5.2739849 
2005 183.05463  106.90015  5.0165794 
  34 








































































































































































As figure B1 shows, results are surprisingly insensitive to imputations from a Pareto 
distribution, though recent years appear to be more affected by imputations of the top two 
percent of the income distribution.  It is likely the procedure adopted here of imputing 
year by year produces an upper bound for variance of volatility estimates (since several 
years for one individual are imputed with no dependence across years, artificially 
inflating the variance across years) and conversely a lower bound for variance of 
inequality estimates. 
 
  35C. Sensitivity to using log family income instead of levels 
The following figures reproduce figures from the text, using different period lengths T, 
and log family income instead of untransformed income. 
Figure C1.  Long-run inequality estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 












































































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  36Figure C2.  Long-run inequality estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 















































































































































































  37Figure C3.  Year-to-year volatility estimates by accounting period, including estimated 
























































































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  38Figure C4.  Year-to-year volatility estimates by accounting period, including estimated 




























































































































































































  39Figure C5.  Multiyear mobility estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 




















































































































































































After tax, Not family-size-adjusted
 
 
  40Figure C6.  Multiyear mobility estimates by accounting period, including estimated tax 
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